China is increasingly challenging a key weakness in America’s technology strategy by targeting an area of the semiconductor industry that Washington has paid comparatively little attention to: the software architecture that allows computer processors to operate.
For years, U.S. policymakers have focused on protecting critical points in the global semiconductor supply chain, including chip manufacturing, advanced lithography equipment, packaging technology and critical minerals. But the growing importance of instruction set architecture, or ISA, is creating another strategic battleground.
An ISA is essentially the language that software uses to communicate with a processor. It determines how a chip performs calculations, moves information and executes instructions.
Two architectures have dominated mainstream computing for decades. x86 has been widely used in personal computers and servers, while Arm has become the leading architecture for smartphones and is increasingly being adopted in automobiles, artificial intelligence systems and other advanced technologies.
The growing importance of ISA technology means that control over computing standards can have strategic consequences extending far beyond chip manufacturing itself.
China has been seeking to strengthen its position in this area through RISC-V, an open-source instruction set architecture. Unlike proprietary architectures, RISC-V allows companies and researchers to develop compatible processors without relying on a single foreign owner for the underlying standard.
That feature has made RISC-V particularly attractive to Chinese technology developers seeking alternatives to technologies controlled by Western companies.
The development presents a challenge for U.S. technology policy. Washington has spent years attempting to restrict China’s access to advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment and high-end computing technologies. But restrictions aimed at physical components may be less effective if Chinese companies can develop competitive alternatives around open technological standards.
The issue also demonstrates how quickly the strategic importance of different parts of the technology ecosystem can change. A policy focused primarily on factories and physical equipment risks overlooking software standards and intellectual property that determine how those components are ultimately used.
For the United States, the challenge is not necessarily to prevent every foreign competitor from using emerging technologies. Instead, policymakers face the more complicated task of ensuring that American companies remain competitive in technologies that could become foundational to future computing.
RISC-V also highlights the limits of traditional export-control strategies. Because its basic architecture is openly available, restricting access to the technology itself could prove considerably more difficult than restricting a specific piece of manufacturing equipment or a particular semiconductor design.
China’s interest in the technology therefore reflects a broader strategy of reducing dependence on foreign-controlled technology while building domestic capabilities.
The development could have implications for artificial intelligence, automobiles, telecommunications, consumer electronics and defense systems, where processor technology is becoming increasingly important.
The debate illustrates a broader problem for Washington: technological competition is no longer confined to the factories that manufacture chips. Control over standards, software and the underlying architecture of computing could become just as important as control over the hardware.
As the United States reassesses its semiconductor strategy, policymakers may need to look beyond traditional chokepoints and consider who controls the technological foundations on which future generations of computers will be built.
China’s growing interest in alternative computing architectures serves as a warning that America’s technological advantage cannot be protected solely through restrictions on physical supply chains. The next major contest may increasingly be fought over the standards and software that determine how the world’s chips actually work.
